Web App Security & Trust Boundaries

Goal

This document explains a future domain governance pack for web app security and trust boundaries in AletheIA.

In simple terms:

make recurring web application security boundaries explicit and reusable, without pretending they belong in the framework core by default.

Why this future pack exists

AletheIA already has generic governance rules that matter for security.

It already reinforces things such as:

• no exposed secrets
• validation in an authoritative layer
• controlled critical actions
• explicit execution boundaries

That is useful, but still too generic for common web application realities such as:

• client versus server separation
• tenant isolation
• API abuse controls
• webhook verification
• logging hygiene
• untrusted content handling

This future pack exists to make those patterns reusable without turning the AletheIA core into a web-only framework.

Core idea

This pack should define a reusable operating layer for web apps and APIs where:

• public surfaces are not treated as authoritative
• sensitive logic stays in the authoritative layer
• data access is scoped correctly
• integrations are verified before trust is granted
• operational artifacts do not become new leak paths

Planned pack blocks

A. Client / Server Separation

This future pack should make explicit that:

• the public client is not the authoritative layer
• secrets and sensitive logic do not belong in the client
• the client should not define critical business truth
• the server or another authoritative layer must hold the final decision for sensitive behavior

B. Secrets & Credential Exposure

This future pack should make explicit that:

• API keys must never live in the frontend
• secrets should remain only in the authoritative layer
• public config and secret config must be distinguished clearly
• secrets should not appear in bundles, logs, traces, or reusable artifacts without necessity

C. Auth & Data Isolation Patterns

This future pack should make explicit that:

• row-level isolation or an equivalent mechanism should exist where per-user or per-tenant data boundaries matter
• authorization must remain explicit and reviewable
• least privilege should be the default posture
• UI visibility is not enough to prove access control correctness

D. Tenant-Scoped Retrieval & Context Assembly

This future pack should make explicit that:

• context sent to models or agents must be scoped before inference
• retrieval should not cross tenant or user boundaries implicitly
• the system, not the model, should decide what context is allowed to be assembled
• broad retrieval should not silently become cross-tenant exposure

E. Authoritative Business Logic

This future pack should make explicit that:

• pricing, payment, permission, eligibility, critical state transitions, and similar rules belong in the authoritative layer
• the client can request or display, but should not become the source of truth for sensitive business logic

F. API & Runtime Hardening

This future pack should make explicit that:

• rate limiting, quotas, throttling, or equivalent abuse controls matter for sensitive routes
• runtime surfaces should degrade safely under ambiguity or abuse
• fail-closed defaults are preferable when critical validation fails
• API trust should not depend only on optimistic assumptions about well-behaved callers

G. Trusted Inbound Integrations

This future pack should make explicit that:

• inbound integrations should be verified before they are trusted
• webhook signatures or equivalent origin checks matter
• idempotency and replay protection should be considered for state-changing inbound events
• inbound integration trust should remain reviewable and auditable

H. Telemetry, Logging & Artifact Hygiene

This future pack should make explicit that:

• logs and traces should not carry secrets or sensitive payloads unnecessarily
• learnings, handoffs, and inference artifacts should follow data minimization
• operational artifacts should not become accidental exfiltration surfaces
• security hygiene includes what gets written down, not only what gets executed

I. Untrusted Content Handling & Rendering Safety

This future pack should make explicit that:

• external content should be treated as untrusted by default
• rendering safety, sanitization, and content handling matter for user-visible and operator-visible surfaces
• content, evidence, and commands should not be collapsed into the same trust category
• external content should not silently become an instruction path

J. Likely Evaluation Scenarios

Good future evaluation scenarios for this pack would include:

• a secret appearing in a client bundle or log
• a cross-tenant retrieval or context leak
• a webhook accepted without source verification
• a sensitive route with no meaningful abuse controls
• a client trying to define price or another critical state transition
• untrusted content being rendered or reused unsafely

What this pack is not

This future pack is not:

• a Supabase tutorial
• a Vercel tutorial
• a complete AppSec manual
• a universal policy for all software systems
• proof that these protections are already enforced by AletheIA itself

The goal is reusable domain governance language, not a vendor-specific implementation handbook.

Relationship to AletheIA today

AletheIA already contains security-adjacent core rules such as:

• security.no_exposed_secrets
• security.authoritative_validation_required
• security.controlled_critical_actions

This future pack would not replace those rules.

It would extend them into a clearer web app and API trust-boundary layer that teams could reuse across real projects.

Good signs

This future pack is going well when:

• web-specific trust boundaries are easier to teach and review
• teams can reuse the logic without inheriting one vendor’s worldview
• security-critical behavior stays in the authoritative layer
• artifacts and telemetry remain part of the security model instead of being ignored

Suggested next reading

• docs/domain-governance-packs.md
• docs/governance.md
• docs/project-extension-pattern.md
• docs/structured-risk-inference.md